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RIGHTS OF MINORITIES AND CHILDREN:
THE LIMITS OF THE LEGAL PROCESS
THOMAS I. EMERSON*
The following address was delivered by Professor Emerson at the New York Univer-
sity School of Law on December 7, 1978, as part of a tribute to the Honorable Janc
Bolin upon her retirement after forty years of service in the New York City Family
Court and its predecessor courts. Judge Bolin, the first black wonan to become a
judge in the United States, has been widely respected during her long carcer for
her continuing efforts on behalf of minority persons and of children. Professor
Emerson reflects in his remarks on the perennial mistreatment of minorities arid
children by the legal system and, suggesting that the structures and goals of that
system create and sustain the problem, points to the need for a social ethic focued
less on personal gain and more on communal responsibility.
I am most happy to be present this evening and to pay tribute to
Judge Jane Bolin. We were classmates at Yale Law School together
and I have followed her career since then with interest and admira-
tion.
I approach with some trepidation this evening's task of discussing
the rights of minorities and children in our present society. I have
never really been a minority-I came out of the middle ranks of the
establishment and in my first opportunity to vote, in the 1928 elec-
tion, cast my ballot for Herbert Hoover rather than Al Smith. I have
been a child, but that was long ago. In my studies and teaching 1
have never focused on the rights of children-they have been omit-
ted from my system of freedom of expression-and ] feel quite igno-
rant in this area. My comments, therefore, at least as to children,
must be considered highly tentative. And I confine my remarks to the
role of law in seeking to achieve our goals in these two crucial aspects
of national life.
I think we must start by recognizing that we have indeed come a
long way. Judge Higginbotham in his book, In the Matter of Color,
has brilliantly described the point from which we began in colonial
times. In my own lifetime I well remember the situation only a few
decades ago. In my college class of 850 males there was not, to my
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recollection, a single black person. On the legal staff of the National
Labor Relations Board, one of the most advanced of the New Deal
agencies, there was not one black lawyer. Organizations which in-
cluded black members could not find a hotel in Washington, D.C.,
the capital of our country, in which to hold a meeting. In fact, as late
as the 1940's blacks could not eat in downtown Washington restau-
rants. As to children, the idea of their possessing any legal rights
apart from their parents or guardians would have been viewed, if the
question was raised at all, as preposterous.
It is important to recognize this forward movement over the
years, not in order to feel smug or satisfied, but in order to keep in
mind that progress is possible and indeed has occurred. The basic
tradition of our society, thus far, has been to improve the status of
minorities and children. The problem before us now is how we can
continue that progress and what new directions may be necessary in
order to do so.
In seeking to achieve equality for minorities and minimum rights
for children we have relied heavily upon law and judicial institutions.
Indeed we have constantly expanded legal doctrines, procedures, and
methods until the legal structure has reached an unparalleled degree
of elaboration and complexity. It is important at this stage, I think, to
appraise the advantages and disadvantages of such an unprecedented
commitment to the legal process as a way of solving social problems.
The positive values inherent in the legal process are many and
well-known to us. The legal doctrines announced by our courts and
the legal mandates enacted by our legislatures, even where reality
falls short of promise, embody the higher ideals and principles to
which society is officially committed. Since the law is inherently
stated in terms of general principles it has a universal quality, which
minorities as well as the establishment can, theoretically at least, in-
voke to their advantage. Judicial institutions can be structured,
through such methods as tenure for judges, independence from other
parts of government, training of personnel, and the like, to afford a
degree of protection to minority rights not available by other means.
The list could be greatly extended.
On the other hand, some negative features of the legal process
have been given less attention, at least by us lawyers. The law is from
the beginning and remains the instrument of the establishment,
created and developed for the establishment; its concessions to
minorities are often grudging and usually inadequate. Similarly, the
law is administered by the establishment, so that the law on the
books does not necessarily reflect the law in practice. Likewise, the
legal process, as it inevitably tends toward increasing complexity, be-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review
December 19781
HeinOnline -- 53 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1241 1978
NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
comes costly, time-consuming, and burdensome, useful only to those
who can afford it and can wait. Most important of all, the legal pro-
cess, by virtue of the very fact that it is founded on general princi-
ples, tends to become impersonal, bureaucratic, not attuned to
human needs. It comes to treat people as fungible things, not indi-
vidual human beings. And over all hangs the prospect that laws and
legal institutions can constitute a protective screen, put forward as
embodying a just solution but actually concealing and diverting atten-
tion from the real injustices that persist.
If we seek to test the success of the legal process by examining
the present status of minority rights we find that progress has stalled
far short of our alleged goals. In economic terms-jobs, wages, and
power-blacks and other minorities are far behind and making little
further advance. In the political arena, where important gains have
been scored, the increase in the number of minority officeholders
seems to have come to a halt. In higher education, minority groups
still represent far less than their share of student bodies and espe-
cially of faculties. Nowhere, even in athletics, has real equality been
achieved.
To some degree this state of affairs is due to the failure of the
courts and legislatures to exploit the advantages of the legal system to
the full extent needed to meet resistance and solve the problems.
The Supreme Court, for example, has issued a series of decisions
narrowing the scope of the equal protection clause. It has refused to
find discrimination in the absence of a showing of specific intent, has
limited the legal consequences of discrimination to the narrowest pos-
sible area, has declined to enforce statewide responsibility for local
discrimination, and has cast doubt upon affirmative action programs.
State and federal legislatures have been reluctant to consider new
approaches or to make funds available for old ones. In general we
have not been willing to push the legal system beyond a commitment
to formal, rather than actual, equality.
The present cessation of progress is also attributable in part,
however, to the limits of the legal process. The courts, perhaps the
most prominent feature of the legal process, have never been able by
themselves to guarantee minority rights against widespread, stubborn
resistance. Thus, for ten years after Brown v. Board of Education the
number of black children going to school with white children in the
eleven southern states did not change by more than a few percentage
points. Even in the case of assuring to minority groups the right of
franchise, presumably one of the less difficult problems, litigation in
the courts made remarkably little headway. It was not until measures
such as cutting off federal funds to state school systems, or the ap-
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pointment of federal registrars of voters, were invoked, or at least
threatened, that segregation in education declined and the right to
vote began to be achieved.
The courts are particularly ineffective, it should be noted, where
the remedy called for is not a simple negative prohibition of conduct
that abridges minority rights but affirmative measures that seek to go
deeper into the roots of the problem. Especially where the appropria-
tion of funds is necessary, the courts are ill-equipped to press into
these new areas.
Nor has the law administered by the executive branch provided
the path to real equality. The administrative process, once viewed as
a simplified substitute for the complexities of the courts, has itself
become enormously intricate and time-consuming. A charge of dis-
crimination handled by administrative procedures becomes a major
operation. The impersonal quality of the law emerges starkly in our
welfare system, where the "servicing" of clients is carried out through
a maze of rules and regulations with little regard for the human fea-
tures of the human beings involved. Further, our basic view of the
law as virtually the only restraint upon individual greed and ambition
makes our whole social structure vulnerable to corruption, an out-
come which is already far advanced.
The failure of law and legal institutions, as we have utilized
them, to solve the problems of assuring minority rights has, it seems
to me, become apparent. We are now in a position where the legal
right to participate in the mainstream is formally guaranteed in most
respects, but where, due to long-standing and deeply ingrained pat-
terns, the conditions of participation remain heavily unequal.
With respect to the rights of children I must, for the reasons
stated, be much more tentative. The extreme individualistic approach
embodied in our legal system plainly raises some special problems
when applied to children. Our law, as we have developed it, assumes
the existence of an individual citizen who is mature, autonomous, re-
sponsible, and possessed of the capacity to make decisions. These
conditions do not exist, or exist to a lesser degree, when children are
involved. The law must therefore take a somewhat different approach.
Indeed, the problems of children would seem to present a special
challenge for our society to develop new methods of social control
which go beyond traditional legal procedures but yet assure fairness
and justice.
My distinct impression is that we have not been able to do this.
Until the turn of the century the law made few, if any, concessions to
the special status of children, except as to the very young. The new
juvenile justice system did attempt to create a new approach, with
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the establishment of juvenile courts, less emphasis on traditional
punishment, more recognition of the social conditions that fostered
juvenile deliquency, and greater attention to treatment of the indi-
vidual child. In recent years, however, there has been a growing rec-
ognition that the juvenile system has developed some very serious
defects. Jurisdiction of the juvenile courts has been extended to
"status" offenses which involve no criminal conduct, proceedings in
the juvenile courts have not always led to a fair result and, particu-
larly, the institutions to which the children are committed are in-
adequate at best and cruel at worst. As Judge Polier has said, the
children suffer from both over-control and neglect at the same time.
One reaction to this situation has been a call to abandon most of
the basic features of the juvenile justice system and return to tradi-
tional legal methods for dealing with youthful offenders. Already the
courts have moved far in the direction of requiring that juvenile
courts adhere to the main elements of due process, including a right
to notice of the charges, the right to counsel, the right to remain
silent, and the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.
In addition there have been proposals to abolish the juvenile courts
altogether, to abandon the effort to deal with juvenile delinquents by
treatment methods, to impose fixed sentences determined solely by
the needs of punishment, to reduce the discretion of institutional au-
thorities to modify original sentences, and otherwise to give up efforts
at rehabilitation.
My reaction to these proposals is that, by and large, we would
be going in the wrong direction. I would favor the introduction of a
substantial amount of due process into the proceedings of juvenile
courts, especially the right to counsel. We would be taking a long
chance with the opportunities of juveniles to obtain justice were we
to have no check upon the operation of juvenile court authorities. But
I am dismayed at the prospect of placing all our hopes upon a
reinstatement of the legal process as it has operated up to now. In
particular, it would seem to me a sad commentary upon the ideals
and imagination of our society were we to consider the main objec-
tive of dealing with juvenile delinquency to be that of imposing
"punishment." We must be able to do better than that.
Thus, the treatment of children and also of minorities pose chal-
lenges that go to the heart of our social order. In essence we need
both to direct our legal system toward more affirmative goals and to
find additional methods of social control.
Law and legal institutions will always play a major role in a
democratic society. There will always be a need for enfbrcing social
decisions by procedures which embody the principle of generality.
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The law must likewise play a vital part in supporting the rights of the
individual and thereby maintaining the crucial line between indi-
vidual freedom and collective responsibility. And law will always be
an instrument for expressing the fundamental ideals and aspirations of
the just society. But we must find ways of making it less inflexible,
less impersonal, more closely tied to the objectives it seeks to
achieve, and more attuned to the needs of the individual. In a sense
we must try to incorporate into the legal process some of the
consciousness-raising that marked the decade of the 1960's. And we
must use it, not as an instrument for perpetuating patterns of indi-
vidual material advantage, but as a means of achieving social justice.
At the same time we must seek new methods of social control
through other institutions- the family, the educational system, the
community, and others not now envisioned. There are, of course,
obvious dangers here. Social institutions, freed from the discipline of
the law, can easily become oppressive. But we are by now aware of
these dangers and can hope to overcome them. In any event the
alternatives are worse.
Finally, let me say that I am not at all sure that we can make
much progress along these lines without far-reaching changes in our
economic and political structure, and without developing a social
ethic that places much less emphasis on personal gain and more on
collective responsibility. Both movements, however, can advance to-
gether.
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